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This thesis examines the impact on the use of container-
ization by the U.S. military for peacetime and contingency
resupply operations of a trend by commercial shippers to
move towards 40 foot containers. A brief history of contain-
erization and its development in the commercial and the
military sectors is followed by a discussion of current
trends in the use of containerization. Such items as the
economic relationship between the shipper and the ship owner,
the impact of container development on ship design, and
military use of containers in peacetime and contingency
operations are examined. The evidence of a trend by the
commercial sector to move towards the 40 foot container
is explored and its possible impact on the military is dis-
cussed. A study designed to assess the impact of this trend
on the military and to determine the feasibility of using
40 foot containers in military resupply operations is
developed. Additionally, alternate solutions are presented.
The final chapter provides an analysis of the solutions
presented and recommendations are made.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the event of contingency, the military must have
the means to move massive tonnages of supplies and equipment
at very short notice. It has been recognized by military
planners that the only way contingency resupply can be moved
is via ocean shipping (sealift) . That the assets to provide
this sealift capability must come from the commercial sector
also has been recognized. [Ref. l:p.9-ll]
When the commercial ocean shipping industry began its
move to containerization, little did the military realize
just what impact that move would have on the methods used
and plans developed to transport military cargo in the event
of contingency. As with any other field of technical develop-
ment, specialized equipment and handling methods have come
to be developed for the efficient movement of cargo in
containerization. Cargo handling gear, ships, port
facilities, and even the containers themselves have evolved
into highly specialized forms.
Recognition by military planners of the importance
commercial assets will play in the event contingency resupply
is required has resulted in the expression of concern over
the availability and suitability of those commercial assets.
Fueled by the lessons observed in the Falkland Islands
Crisis, military planners have voiced grave misgivings over
the status of the U.S. flag fleet in terms of the total
number of vessels that would be available in the event of
contingency. Additional concern has been voiced over the
unsuitability of many of those vessels for military
operations. [Ref. 2:pp. 37-39]
It is widely recognized, both by military planners and
by the commercial sector that the container ships in use
today are not well-suited to military operations [Ref. l:p 11]
What has often failed to be recognized is that these ships
are only one link in the containerization chain. The link
as it were that drives all aspects of containerization is
the container itself, at which very little attention has
been directed.
A. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
Because the containers in use by the commercial ocean
shipping industry are just as important to military con-
tingency planning as are the ships needed to move them,
this thesis examines the status of the container as it is
used by both the military and the commercial sector. The
objective of this thesis is to evaluate the current trend
by the commercial ocean shipping industry to move towards
the 40 foot container and to provide the framework for a
study designed to evaluate the impact of that trend on
military peacetime and contingency resupply containerization
planning
.
B. PREVIEW OF THE THESIS
The following chapter discusses the development and
implementation of containerization within the commercial
shipping industry. Chapter II addresses the advantages
and disadvantages the commercial sector has realized from
the use of containerization.
Chapter III provides a brief discussion of the develop-
ment of containerization and its initial implementation
by the military. A brief overview of military utilization
of containerization in peacetime and planned use in con-
tingency is provided.
Chapter IV looks closely at the current trends in con-
tainerization in both the commercial and the military sectors
These trends are compared and the results of that comparison
are examined in terms of the impact on military planning.
Chapter V provides the framework for a study designed
to assist military planners in evaluating the impact of
the trend toward the 40 foot container on both peacetime
and contingency resupply container operations. Additionally,
other alternative problem solutions are presented and
evaluated in terms of appropriateness of response.




As is true of so many other industries, the changes
that have occurred in the ocean shipping industry since
the end of World War II have been, to say the least, star-
tling. New concepts in cargo handling, ship design and chang-
ing economic factors have combined to change the industry
almost beyond recognition. What used to be a highly labor
intensive industry is now almost completely machine run,
from the vessels themselves to the methods used for handling
the cargo. [Ref. 3:pp. 11-13]
Perhaps more than any other factor, the concept of con-
tainerization has been responsible for this change in the
industry. Considered by many to be the force which has
revolutionized the ocean transportation industry, the impact
of containerization on ocean shipping has been compared
to the impact of the assembly line on the automobile
industry. [Ref. 4:p. 5] Containerization has resulted in
the development of new ship types, new methods of cargo
handling as well as new designs in cargo handling equipment
[Ref. l:p. 11]. But the changes have not stopped there;
port design has been radically affected, with the result
that the world of shipping with containers bears little
or no resemblance to that of its predecessor, break bulk
shipping [Ref. 5:p. 16].
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A. CONTAINERI ZATION DEFINED
Although lauded as a revolutionary force as a result
of its impact on the transportation industry in general
and the ocean shipping industry in particular, the container
is nothing more than a box, too large for manual handling
[Ref. 3:p. 11]. Containers are reusable and, although
capable of being transported by truck, do not have permanently
attached wheels. Modern containers are constructed of either
steel, aluminum, or fiberglass. The material used for
construction is based on the user's requirements in terms
of expected life of the container and the physical conditions
under which it will be used. [Ref. 5:p. 13]
The concept of containerization refers to the use of
containers in conjunction with various modes of transport.
Because of the standardization of containers, goods are
able to be moved from origin to destination, via various
modes of transport, without the goods themselves having
to be unloaded or repackaged. [Ref. 5: p. 25] Containeriza-
tion not only economizes on cargo handling, but provides
greater protection to cargo from pilferage and damage
[Ref. 6:p. 40]
.
B. COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONTAINERIZATION
The use of containers to transport cargo is by no means
an invention of the twentieth century. From the earliest
of times, man has recognized that the combining of multiple
12
units of goods into a single unit makes for an easier and
more efficient method of transport. Boxes, barrels, crates
and sacks have been used to transport goods.
As a system of transport, however, containerization
is a purely twentieth century concept. Containerization
provides a means of transporting various types of cargo
via varied means of transport and thus provides the basis
for intermodal transportation. Because it allows cargo
to be transported from origin to destination, from the
manufacturing site to the distribution point, containeriza-
tion has become an integral part of the transportation
industry as it exists today.
As with so many other innovations, rising costs and
concern over decreasing profit margins provided the impetus
that led to the development of containerization [Ref. 5: p. 5]
Traditional break bulk cargo operations, because they were
highly labor intensive, caused shipping costs to rise
rapidly after World War II [Ref. 5:pp. 1-3]. Because minimal
use was made of machinery, break bulk operations were slow
and tedious, to say nothing of dangerous [Ref. 3:pp. 11-13].
Individual units of cargo had to be manually loaded, stowed
and discharged. Palletizing cargo, when suitable, reduced
the amount of handling required, but did not obviate the
necessity for manual handling.
Because break bulk operations are slow, the time spent
by cargo ships in port was sometimes as much, if not more
13
than, the time spent in transit from one port to the next.
Over and above the time required for the actual cargo
operations, time was required to organize the labor.
Stevedore gangs were contracted for on the basis of manually
prepared stow plans. Last minute changes due to cargo
availability or non-availability could necessitate the
revamping of the stow plans and subsequent changes in the
labor requirements. Labor arrangements generally had to
be finalized prior to the commencement of cargo operations,
so last minute changes could prove to be quite expensive.
[Ref. 5:pp. 1-5]
Labor strikes, work slowdowns, unexpected delays result-
ing from inclement weather -- these are just a few of the
occurrences that could contribute to the requirement of
additional time to get a vessel loaded, stowed and underway.
As new markets opened up around the world and as market com-
petition increased, shippers became more demanding regarding
the timeliness of cargo delivery. [Ref. 5:p 19]
Vessel port turn-around time was also of great concern
to the ship owners [Ref. 3:p. 13]. Because in-port costs
constitute a large part of all costs incurred as a part
of vessel operations, the time required for cargo operations
came out of owner profit margins. Additionally, it must
be remembered that ships in port do not earn revenue; it
is only in the carriage of cargo between ports that revenue
14
is earned. It is therefore of paramount concern to ship
owners that vessels spend as little time in port as possible
It was Malcolm McLean, owner of McLean Trucking Company,
who was responsible for the implementation of containeriza-
tion in the ocean shipping industry. Recognizing that
substantial savings could be realized by both shipper and
carrier if cargo handling requirements could be reduced,
McLean felt that the answer was a container similar to that
used in the household goods moving industry. This container
would be packed at origin, loaded on a trailer, trucked
to the part and loaded onto the vessel. Cargo discharge
would be handled in a similar manner. The first trial run
was made in 1956 with sixty containers loaded in New York
for discharge in Houston. [Ref. 6:p. 11]
Interestingly enough, the ocean shipping industry more
or less ignored the implications of what McLean was doing
with containerization. Although Matson Lines did start
running containers on its U.S. West Coast - Hawaii run
shortly after this, it was not until McLean announced that
his new shipping lines, Sea-Land, would start regular trans-
atlantic container service that the ocean shipping industry
treated containerization with any kind of serious interest.
The year was 1966 and suddenly the ocean shipping industry
found itself on the threshold of a new era. [Ref. 6:p. 11]
Some sources seem to feel that it was not the announce-
ment of the existence of transatlantic container service
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that suddenly awakened the ocean carriers to containeriza-
tion, rather standardization is given the credit. Container
standardization had been under discussion as early as 1961;
however, it was in 1967 that the International Standards
Organization agreement was signed. This agreement standard-
ized container size at 8'x8' end sections, in lengths of
10, 20, 30 and 40 feet. Corner lifting devices were also
standardized as a result of this agreement. The implication
was that as a result of standardization, a world wide trans-
portation system could be developed, with the container
as its basic element. [Ref. 3:pp. 13-14]
Regardless of the cause, there can be no doubt that
this move towards standardization signalled the start of
containerization. From a total of five shipping lines
operating container service from the United States in 1966,
the number increased to 88 by 1969. It should be pointed
out, however, that very few of these companies offered
specialized container service. At best, container service
was limited to what would fit on deck. The reluctance of
ship owners to jump in totally to containerization may be
attributed to various factors, not the least of which was
the capital investment necessary to make the switch from
break bulk operations to containerization. [Ref. 3:pp. 13-15]
Whatever may have been responsible for the reluctance
on the part of the ship owners, it has been overcome. Today,
containerization is the major method of transport utilized
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by the ocean shipping industry. Break bulk shipping is
becoming a thing of the past. Cargo ships are containerships
;
they are designed to carry containers and nothing but con-
tainers, unless designed for specialized commodities (e.g.,
bulk carriers, chemical and petroleum tankers). Today,
the ocean shipping industry talks about fleets of containers,
as well as the number of ships capable of carrying containers.
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF CONTAINERIZATION
As was discussed earlier, the driving force behind the
development of containerization as an active transportation
concept was an interest on the part of both the shipper
and of the carrier to reduce costs involved in the ocean
shipment of cargo. By substantially reducing cargo handling
requirements, not only have cargo handling costs been reduced
for shippers, but port turn-around times have been reduced
tremendously for carriers. [Ref. 5: p. 5]
Because a container is locked and sealed at point of
origin and remains so until arrival at destination, pilferage
has been substantially reduced. This is of particular
concern for cargo owners who must view cargo pilferage as
cargo loss. Although pilferage does still occur, it can
generally be traced to either the loading or unloading of
the container, rather than during transport. [Ref. 6:p. 40]
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Cargo damage has been substantially reduced as well.
Although some shoring is still required for cargo loaded
into containers, cargo consignors are better able to mix
and match their cargo to ensure maximum use of container
capacity. The tighter the cargo can be loaded, the less
damage that is likely to result from cargo movement in
transit. Additionally, because containers are handled
mechanically, there tends to be less stevedoring damage
to containerized cargo. The container itself offers
additional packaging protection for the cargo, particularly
from the elements. [Ref. 5:pp. 5-6]
The tremendous capital investment required to support
containerization is a primary disadvantage of the system
[Ref. 5:p. 24]. Because containerization is a capital
intensive industry, relying on specialized equipment, rather
than a labor intensive industry, all participants experience
high start up costs. Ship owners have had to design and
construct new vessels that are capable of transporting
large numbers of containers. Special equipment has had
to be designed and purchased by both ship owners and port
operators for the movement of containers. This equipment,
which must be capable of handling fully loaded containers,
must also have a high degree of reliability when faced with
the ever increasing numbers of containers moving through
the ports. [Ref. 5:pp. 16-17]
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The containers themselves are expensive. Containers
are not indestructible; in the normal course of cargo oper-
ations, containers do take a beating, not only as a result
of equipment handling mishaps, but also from exposure to
the elements. Although more and more container owners are
looking at repair as a means of extending container lift,
it is an expensive option. Under normal conditions of use,
life expectancy for a container is considered to be from
seven to ten years. [Ref. 7]
It must be recognized that containers themselves set
restrictions regarding the types of cargo that are moved
via containerization. Because of limitations on cargo weight
and cube resulting from the physical design of the containers
themselves, not all cargoes are suitable for containeriza-
tion. As break bulk shipping has given way to containeriza-
tion, shippers have been faced with rising costs for the
shipment of non-containerizable cargo [Ref. 8].
Ports have been faced with serious land problems [Ref. 7]
.
Because large tracts of land adjacent to port areas are
required to provide marshalling yards for containers, prots
have faced tremendous difficulty and expense in attempts
to keep up with containerization. The loss of revenue that
can result from an inability to keep up with the demands
of containerization is felt not only by the port itself,
but by the surrounding metropolitan area as well.
19
The advantages of containerization for both the shipper
and the carrier far outweigh the disadvantages. Once
implemented, the question the ocean shipping industry must
have asked itself at one time or another is, "Why did it
take us so long?" Clearly containerization is the method
of transportation that is here to stay; in the not too far
distant future break bulk shipping may well be a thing of
the past [Ref. 9:p. 36].
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III. MILITARY CONTAINERIZATION
While great effort has been expended on explaining the
economic implications of containerization on the commercial
sector, not to mention the many reasons given for the
commercial sector's impetus for developing containerization,
a search of literature written about the development of
containerization provides little information concerning
the involvement of the U.S. miltiary in the early stages
of the development of containerization. Credit, however,
must be given to the U.S. Army for its efforts in regards
to the development of the first extensive container transport
operation [Ref. 5:p. 5]. An understanding of the military
requirements and needs that led to the initial interest
in containerization of cargo will provide a better appreci-
ation of the role initially envisioned by military planners
of containerization in contingency.
A. MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OF CONTAINERIZATION
One of the biggest problems faced by military logistic-
ians during and after World War II was the damage and loss
sustained by military cargo in the process of transportation.
As a result, the U.S. Army directed that an analysis of
its logistics system be performed; the result was the
determination that some sort of cargo consolidation should
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be implemented prior to transport. It was also recommended
that a system of cargo protection be developed. A container
made of metal appeared to offer at least a partial solution
to the problem. [Ref. 5:p. 5]
Further analysis of the full range of military cargo
revealed that fully 40 per cent of the total not only was
suitable for containerization, but would also benefit from
it [Ref. 5: p. 6]. As a result, the Army developed and
introduced a standard sized CONEX (Container Express) box
that was designed to be fully intermodal. Although the
first containers experimented with by the Army were made
of wood, metal containers were used in 1952 to transport
military cargo from Ohio to Japan and from there to Korea.
[Ref. 10:p. 32]
The CONEX box, which proved successful both in protect-
ing the military cargo from pilferage and damage from the
environment, also reduced cargo handling. Constructed of
steel in two sizes (6 ' 3 "x6 ' 10 "x4 ' 3 " and 6 ' 3 "x6 ' 10 M x8 ' 6 " )
,
they were capable of being mixed for shipping, stacking
or storing. Also designed to be fully intermodal, they
were capable of being transported by rail, truck, ship and
army vehicles. The larger CONEX box proved to be the most
popular size and was considered by many to have been the
backbone of logistic support during the Vietnam Conflict.
[Ref. 10:p. 33]
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It was in Korea that the U.S. military recognized one
of the greatest advantages offered by containerization
.
Because the Korean ports tended to be extremely congested,
the time savings realized from container movement as opposed
to traditional break bulk operations was significant. For
the military, time savings cannot always be measured in
terms of dollars and cents; rather, time savings are commonly
measured as a result of the savings in lives realized as
a result of the timely receipt of supplies. [Ref. 5:p. 6]
The military owned 80,000 CONEX boxes in 1959. By 1965,
the Army and the Air Force jointly owned approximately
100,000 CONEX boxes. These CONEX boxes carried most of
the military cargo destined for Vietnam at that time. The
number of CONEX boxes was nearly doubled as the war escalated
The military was so satisfied with the results of container-
ization that full containership service using 20 foot van-
sized containers was introduced for supply to Vietnam in
1967. [Ref. 7:p. 6]
Between 1968 and 1969, the military procured a total
of 6,700 military vans (MILVANs). These containers, which
measured 8'x8'x20' / were purchased in order to expand the
military's existing intermodal container capability.
Equipped with a coupleable chassis and a moveable running
gear (bogey), these containers constituted the military's
container fleet. Of the total number of MILVANs procured,
4,500 had built-in restraint systems designed for the
23
transport of ammunition. These original restraint MILVANs
are currently the only containers approved for the trans-
portation of ammunition. [Ref. 10:pp. 34-35]
B. PEACETIME UTILIZATION OF CONTAINERIZATION
Recognizing that containerization has become the dominant
mode of cargo transport within the ocean shipping industry,
the Department of Defense has promulgated policy directing
that as much cargo as possible will be containerized. This
policy has resulted in ever increasing amounts of military
cargo moving in containers. In 1970, for example, approx-
imately 25 per cent of all military cargo moved world wide
was moved in containers [Ref. ll:pp.2-4] . Most of this
cargo was household goods. By 1978, approximately 90 per
cent of all military cargo was containerized [Ref. 9:p. 36].
This trend has continued to the point where, today, the
only cargos not moved in containers are those that do not
lend themselves to containerization (e.g., petroleum).
Additionally, most vehicles moved by the military are not
transported in containers because it is either not economical
because of quantities involved or because of size restrictions
(military vehicles)
.
Estimates indicate that the total amount of cargo being
containerized will continue to increase. Until recently,
the Military Sealift Command (MSC) was operating break bulk
and roll-on/roll-off vessels for the transport of military
24
cargo on selected trade routes. Many of these vessels have
been laid up; therefore, cargo that was normally carried
on them will now be booked to commercial carriers for trans-
port and will be containerized.
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) provides container
service to those military locations not serviced by commercial
shipping companies. This container service provides resupply
shipping for military bases in Antarctica, the Arctic, Wake
Island and Diego Garcia. Previously, Army owned MILVANs
were used to provide this service; as a result of their
recall by DARCOM, commercial 20 foot containers have been
procured by MSC under a lease-option-to-buy contract and
are being used to provide this service. [Ref. 12]
C. CONTINGENCY UTILIZATION OF CONTAINERIZATION
Unlike the commercial sector, the military must plan
for contingency situations when it will be necessary to
transport tremendous amounts of cargo at very short notice.
The military has not had an opportunity to exercise this
tasking since the Vietnam era; it is therefore of paramount
concern that military planners keep a close eye on both
contingency requirements and the feasibility of military
plans regarding those requirements.
Military planners estimate that roughly 95 per cent
of all logistics support required in the event of contingency
will have to be moved via sealift. The need to move this
25
quantity of cargo quickly demands the use of containerization.
Recognition of this need is so strong that the Military
Sealift Command has earmarked some 94,000 containers owned
by commercial contractors and committed by them for short
term military use in an emergency short of mobilization.
[Ref. 13 :p. 12] This estimate stipulates "short term"
usage. No allowance is made for container casualties nor
does the estimate provide for additional requirements should
the emergency escalate or become a multiple front emergency.
Although the military does recognize the role container-
ization will play in strategic mobility, the concern of
most planners seems to lie with the fact that most commercial
ships are not suited for military operations [Ref. 14:pp. 12-13
In order to be of maximum benefit in a contingency situation,
a containership needs to be self-sustaining. This was one
of the most attractive features of the old break bulk vessels
in the eyes of the military: they were equipped with ship-
board cranes capable of handling all cargo stowed within
the ship. [Ref. l:p. 11]
Modern containerships have no need to be self-sustaining
since ports generally have cranes capable of handling all
container operations. To equip a containership with its
own cranes is a very expensive proposition, particularly
if those cranes are not necessary or vital to vessel oper-
ations. It is unusual for a vessel to be so equipped; if
so, it is generally because the vessel operators have
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designed the vessel for a specific trade route or unusual
operations where shore cranes are not available [Ref. 15: p. 13]
The problem for the military is that, in the event of
contingency operations, there is no guarantee that port
cranes will be operational or that they will even exist.
In recognition of this problem, the military has been
involved since the early 1970s in attempts to develop methods
for discharging containerships without the use of shore-
side cranes or even docks. "Over-the-Shore Discharge of
Containership" (OSDOC) , "Logistics-Over-the-Shore" (LOTS)
,
and "Container Offloading and Transfer System" (COTS) are
just three of these. To date, no ideal system has been
developed; however, the lessons learned and expertise gained
in this area have been invaluable to military planners.
Lessons learned from these programs have resulted in
the development of new equipment designed to overcome the
problems attached to discharging containerships without
conventional port facilities. New techniques have been
developed to counter the effects of ship movement and the
difficulties contingent on the conduct of such operations
under less than ideal conditions. [Ref. 16]
Another problem faced by the military planners in planning
for contingencies with containerization is that of the
characteristics of much of the cargo required by the
military. Much of the cargo required by the military is
unsuitable for containerization because of size and, in
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some cases, weight. [Ref. 16] In an effort to deal with
these problems, military planners have been actively involved
in the design and testing of new container types. Addition-
ally, attention has been directed towards optimal ship design
[Ref. 13:pp. 12-14]
.
As a result, the conversion of the SL-7s was designed
to afford capabilities that would alleviate these problems.
Originally designed as super-containerships with tremendous
speed capability, the ships have been converted to roll-on/
roll-off ships, while retaining much of their container
capability.
The SL-7 conversion is a unique solution for the military;
unfortunately, the money and time required to modify all
ships that may be required for use in a contingency are
not available in sufficient quantities to the military.
Recognizing that as time goes by, more and more of the ships
built and owned by U.S. flag carriers will be non-self-
sustaining containerships , the military has developed and
is now acquiring flatracks. Flatracks enable the conversion
of comtemporary containerships to fit the requirements of
odd or out-sized military equipment. Although they are
nothing more than platforms with collapsible sides, the
military is hopeful that they will provide the solution
to at least one of the problems presented by containerization
in contingency. [Ref. 17:p. 9]
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Contingency planning is difficult from the standpoint
that all decisions made and plans formed must be based on
estimates. An additional problem faced by the military
is that of cost constraints. It is economically infeasible
for the military to own all of the equipment that may be
required in the event of contingency. Reliance on the
commercial sector is absolutely necessary.
Unfortunately the needs of the commercial sector do
not always parallel those of the military. Driven by the
dictates of profit, the commercial sector is not always
concerned with how its developments may impact on military
contingency planning. Major changes often occur in the
civilian sector which require the revamping of currently
existing plans.
The military, once committed to a course of action,
is often stuck with that decision. The complexity of the
budgeting process, combined with congressional concern over
military spending, and the inevitable inelasticity of the
national budget — all of these combined mean that the
military cannot indiscriminately purchase equipment that
it feels might be necessary in the event of a contingency.
The phrase, "in the event of a contingency," is often viewed
as providing insufficient justification for funding.
[Ref. 18:pp. 1-6]
The Iranian Conflict and Falkland Islands Crisis have helped
the military planners in providing justification for their
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concern regarding contingency resupply. The lessons learned,
particularly from the difficulties encountered by the British
in providing resupply to a war half a world away, have pro-
vided the military planners with the credibility needed
to back their concern for military capability to respond
in similar situations. [Ref. 14:pp. 11-12]
Future military contingency planning will center more
and more on the issues of resupply. The realization of
the role containerization will play will become more and
more obvious as time passes. Because the military cannot
hope to possess sufficient assets to meet the needs for
contingency resupply, reliance on the commercial sector
will continue. It is imperative that military planners
not only recognize this, but that they are aware of the
direction the commercial sector is going in regards to equip-
ment usage and development in order to ensure adequate
contingency planning.
30
IV. CURRENT TRENDS IN CONTAINER! ZATION
Containerization has evolved into a highly developed
industry. Having recognized its inherent advantages of
cost savings to both the shipper and the ship owner, con-
tinuing efforts have been made to further increase those
savings. Responsiveness to shipper needs was identified
as the key element for successful operation of container
shipping service. To that end, the ocean shipping industry
has left no stones unturned in its attempts to improve upon
the original concept. [Ref. 19:pp. 32-33]
For the military also containerization has undergone
changes. These changes have resulted from the recognition
by military planners of the advantages containerization
has provided the commercial shipping industry. Trends in
military use of containerization have tended to develop
in response to changes within the commercial sector.
Acceptance of the role commercial shipping assets will have
to play in contingency resupply has provided the military
with the impetus to further explore and adapt containeriza-
tion to its operational requirements. [Ref. 13:pp. 12-13]
A. CURRENT TRENDS IN COMMERCIAL CONTAINERIZATION
When looking at trends in the commercial usage of con-
tainerization, it is necessary to remember that the primary
motivating force behind any decision made by either shipper
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or ship owner is that of profit. Any businessman, in order
to operate successfully within a system of free enterprise,
must concern himself with the return he is able to recognize
from his investments. Profit, after all, is what is left
of revenue once costs have been met. Revenue and costs,
then, must form the cornerstones of future planning in terms
of response to the market.
The ship owner, then, when planning for future capital
investments in terms of ships and cargo equipment, must
consider those factors that will lead to increased net
revenues. Revenues can be increased as a result of greater
responsiveness to customer needs in terms of service, while
decreased costs can result from increased productivity from
ships and cargo equipment.
Productivity has been closely looked at by the ocean
shipping industry. Although the size of the ship plays
a significant role in productivity, the industry has recog-
nized that container size itself is of equal importance.
[Ref. 19:p. 32] From the standpoint of the shipper, of
course, the size of the container must be of major concern,
since container size impacts on handling costs. For the
ship owner, container size provides responsiveness to shipper
need, and is at least a partial key to market competitiveness
Being competitive in the market is, however, only a
part of the picture. In order to assure an acceptable
profit margin, it is necessary for operating costs to be
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kept as low as possible. The costs involved in the ocean
portion of vessel operations remain relatively constant,
regardless of the load carried by the ship [Ref. 19:p. 32].
In order to spread those costs as thinly as possible over
the total number of containers carried, it is necessary
to carry as many containers as possible.
Most ship owners recognized early on that simply building
big containerships was not the answer to the problem. Tre-
mendous capacity does a profit margin no good whatsoever
if that capacity is not being used. Responsiveness to shipper
needs provides the link between size and use. Thus, container
size has come to be considered as a manipulative factor.
[Ref. 20:p. 59]
It is interesting to note that in the early days of
containerization, container size was determined, in fact,
solely as a result of shipper requirements. Sea Land, as
the pioneer in containerization, ran 35 foot containers,
not as a random whim, but because that was the size van
that was used in its trucking operations. By standardizing
the size, Sea Land was able to offer the shipper the concept
of intermodal transportation, with door to door service.
[Ref. 5:p. 7]
Matson Lines, who became the second U.S. shipping company
to enter into containerization, opted for 24 foot containers.
Serving the U.S. West Coast - Hawaii trade route, Matson
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selected the 24 foot size because it corresponded to west
coast highway restrictions in effect in the late 1950s.
[Ref. 21:p. 35]
In addition to these sizes, 10 foot, 20 foot, 27 foot
and 40 foot containers made appearances, all designed to
cater to the needs of specific shipping groups. In 1961
the International Standards Organization Technical Committee
104 (ISOTC 104) adopted as the standard for container size
the 35 foot container. Selected primarily because it was
a size on which all participants of the Committee could
agree, it was the size used by Sea Land and was designed
to cater to the intermodal needs of the U.S. shippers.
Although 40 foot containers were making an appearance in
the U.S., their length was not accepted by all states for
legal highway drayage. [Ref. 22:p. 73]
As the European countries actively entered into the
use of containerization, other container sizes became
standardized by the ISOTC 104. The 40 foot containers, as
well as its 20 foot and 10 foot derivatives, were particularly
favored by the Europeans. Because of limitations imposed
by narrow roads and the difficulties of transporting the
large containers over old European roads, the 20 foot con-
tainer was preferred on trade routes running out of Europe,
while the 35 foot and 40 foot containers were most popular
on the trade routes running out of the U.S. [Ref. 22: p. 74]
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Container size remained relatively stable until 1981
when American President Lines (APL) announced its decision
to test 45 foot containers on the U.S. West Coast - Far
East trade routes. This decision was made by APL because
cargo shipped over these routes tends to have a higher
volume to weight ratio (and is considered to be cube cargo)
,
for which this longer length was specifically designed.
Although 5 feet longer in length, the weight capacity of
the 45 foot containers has been maintained at that set for
the 40 foot containers under ISOTC 104. APL has made it
very clear that these 45 foot containers are not designed
to replace the 40 footers; rather, they were designed to
meet a specific need on a specific trade route. [Ref. 23 :p. 16]
The decision to run the 45 foot containers has been,
at least to this point and as far as future indicators show,
very successful. In August of 1984, APL ' s 45 foot containers
were run via train to the East Coast of the U.S., completing
a U.S. East Coast - Far East intermodal transportation route.
The indications are that this full circle intermodal use
of 45 foot containers will become the routine for APL, at
least over this trade route. [Ref. 24] The Vice President
for Marketing for APL, Mr. Mike Uremich, stated the following
when questioned as to the impetus behind the firm's move
to the larger containers:
"We run our ships where the market tells us to run them,
not where we have historically run them, not where it
might be operationally convenient." [Ref. 20 :p. 59]
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This quote might have just as well been attributed to Malcolm
McLean, who followed much the same philosophy in his develop-
ment and initial implementation of containerization
.
Although much might be said regarding industry trends
in terms of vessel design, discussion will be limited to
the current trends in container size. Despite the various
choices available to the commercial shipper, the tendency
is for certain sized containers to be more commonly selected.
The forces driving the selection of these sizes are not
easily recognized, however.
There can be no doubt that the trend in containerization
is toward larger boxes. Matson Lines has announced that
it will forsake its 24 foot containers on its overseas
routes and will use the 40 foot length [Ref . 25] . Even
Sea Land, who not only owned the world's fleet of 35 foot
containers, but operated a complete intermodal transportation
system with 35 foot containers as its basic unit, has
announced that by 1986 it will be running only 40 foot con-
tainers [Ref. 7]. Although American President Lines, as
discussed previously, has introduced the 45 foot container,
there are no intentions at this time to discontinue use
of the 40 foot containers in their fleet [Ref. 26].
The general concensus, at least among the U.S. flag
carriers, is that the container of the future will be the
40 foot container. It is expected that, rather than the
6" height in use today, the containers of the near future
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will be 9'6" in height [Ref. 26]. A drawback to this greater
height is the low clearance of bridges and overpasses in
many parts of the world [Ref. 22:p. 75].
What is interesting is the dominance of the 40 foot
container over its rivals, the 35 foot and 20 foot containers.
The reasons for the emergence of the 40 foot size as the
preferred container for most shippers are many, all of which
are based on economics [Ref. 7]
.
The 40 foot container has traditionally been more popular
on the trade routes running from the U.S. to the Far East
and to Europe, while the 20 foot container has been preferred
on the trade routes running out from Europe. A possible
explanation for this trend may be the difference in the
types of cargo shipped over these routes. Those cargos
shipped from the U.S. tend to be light in weight, while
those cargos shipped out of Europe to the rest of the world
tend to be heavier. [Ref. 22:p. 75] Since box size selection
is based on the compatibility of the container characteristics
with those of the cargo, finished goods, for example, which
tend to be lighter in weight in relation to volume than
do raw or semi-finished goods, are better suited to the
larger container size. Prior to 1978, the majority of con-
tainers delivered to fleet owners were 20 foot containers;
deliveries of 40 foot containers rarely exceeded one-third
of the number of 20 foot containers delivered [Ref. 27:p. 73].
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The actual ratio of 20 foot containers to 40 foot con-
tainers in the world's container fleet was 2.46 units to
one in the early 1980s; by the start of 1983, however, the
ratio was 2.8 twenty foot units to each 40 foot unit
(Figure 1) [Ref . 28:p. 59]
.
1980 1983
20 foot 1,297,771 2,141,987
40 foot 526,462 763,041
Others 1 101,483 86,970
Total 1,925,716 2,991,998
1Others includes 10ft., 24ft., 27ft., 30ft., and 35ft.
Figure 1. World Container Fleet by Length
[Ref. 28:p. 72]
The comparison of box size by totals owned is interesting
in that the U.S. owned container fleet is substantially
larger than that of any other flag of ownership. In 1983,
the U.S. owned approximately 44.8 per cent of the world's
total container fleet. The next major owner, the United
Kingdom, accounts for the ownership of 12.4 per cent of
the total world's fleet. This represents an increase for
the United Kingdom from 8.93 per cent in 1980, and a decrease
for the U.S. from 54.6 per cent of the total world's fleet
of that same year (Figure 2) [Ref. 29:p. 41].
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1980 1983
United States 1,004,531 1,286,722
United Kingdom 186,640 400,954
Other 722,227 1,304,323
Total 1,913,398 2,991,999
Figure 2. World Container Fleet by Country of
Ownership [Ref. 28:p. 61]
Analysis of 1983 statistics shows that 64.5 per cent
of all containers owned by U.S. shipping and container
leasing companies are 20 foot containers, while 30.4 per cent
are 40 foot containers, and 4 per cent are 35 foot containers
Of the 51,108 total 35 foot containers in the U.S. fleet,
88 per cent are owned by Sea Land. The ratio of 20 foot
to 40 foot containers in 1983 was 2.1 twenty foot containers
to each 40 foot container (Figure 3). [Ref. 30:pp. 38-41]
20ft 35ft 40ft Others 1
Leasing Companies 760,325 289,861 4
Shipping Companies 16,950 37,385 78,568 11,106
Military 5,658 2
Others includes 45ft., 30ft., 27ft., and 24ft.
2 This is composed of 1,559 general cargo MILVANs and
4,099 ammunition restraint equipped MILVANs. [Ref. 25]
Figure 3. U.S. Container Fleet - Dry Van Totals
for 1983 [Ref. 30:pp. 38-40]
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By 1986, the date selected by Sea Land for the completion
of the conversion of their shipping operations to 40 foot
containers from 35 foot containers, the U.S. container
fleet can be expected to show a somewhat different composition
Sea Land, who has opted for conversion rather than replace-
ment of the majority of its 35 foot containers [Ref. 7],
will substantially diminish the world's supply of 35 foot
containers. The result will be an increase to the 40 foot
portion of the U.S. fleet of approximately 4 per cent
[Ref. 30:p. 38]. This projected change includes no allowance
for asset growth.
Analysis of the 1983 statistics also indicates that 81.5
per cent of the U.S. container fleet is owned by leasing
companies. Their portion of the world's container fleet
accounts for approximately 36.5 per cent of the total number
of containers available world-wide. [Ref. 29: p. 43]
These statistics would seem to belie indications of
a trend by the ocean shipping industry to be moving toward
the larger (40 foot) container. Remembering that the
statistics used were based on the makeup of the container
fleet as of January 1983, the statistics for 1984 can be
expected to show a different picture, if for no other reason
than the start of conversion of the Sea Land container fleet.
Additionally, forecasts of purchasing activity by U.S.
container leasing companies indicate a movement toward the
40 foot container [Ref. 31:pp. 18-19].
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Reports from U.S. container leasing firms state that,
during the first six months of 1984, they were making their
first major purchases of containers in recent years.
Attributing their decisions to increase their fleet size
to the up-swing in the world's economy, the leasing companies
have indicated a belief that demand for leased containers
will continue to increase. Most of the purchases made by
Xtra, Itel, Sea Containers, Transamerica and TOL have been
for 40 foot containers. For example, of the 20,000 contain-
ers ordered by Xtra, the ratio of 40 foot containers to
20 foot containers was 3:1. [Ref. 31:pp. 18-19] Itel ordered
11,000 forty foot containers out of a total 13,000 containers
[Ref. 32] . Sea Containers follows this trend by ordering
an estimated 70 per cent of their total 30,000 container
order in 40 foot lengths [Ref. 31:p. 19]. Transamerica '
s
order was for a total of 16,000 containers, of which 14,000
were 40 footers [Ref. 33].
While these numbers would indicate a preference for
40 foot containers, it must be stressed that many of these
orders are an attempt by container lessors to balance out
their currently existing oversupply of 20 foot containers.
This oversupply, which resulted from tremendous purchases
of 20 foot containers made in the 1970s and the early 1980s,
was a result of a general recession in world wide shipping.
[Ref. 31:pp. 18-19] It is anticipated that the 20 foot
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container will continue to hold its own in markets other than
those dominated by U.S. shippers [Ref. 32].
Representatives of the three largest U.S. flag carriers --
Sea Land, American President Lines and U.S. Lines — when
interviewed, indicated that the trend in the container
industry is most definitely towards the larger box. As
discussed on pages 36-38 of this thesis, the general con-
census among these three is that the 20 foot container has
lost its popularity with shippers and ship owners alike
for a variety of reasons, all of which show marked indica-
tions of continuing to grow in importance over time.
Probably the single most important reason given for
this trend towards the 40 foot container, at least within
the U.S. shipping industry, is the cost of intermodal trans-
portation. As a result of deregulation of the trucking
industry and of the Staggers Act, which allows for an 80
foot maximum truck-trailer length, it has become uneconomical
for shippers to move 20 foot containers over the road [Ref. 7]
Line haul costs are nearly the same and, in some cases,
are the same for 20 foot containers as they are for 40
footers. The result is that the shipper actually ends up
paying more per ton of cargo moved in a 20 foot container
than he pays for the movement of that same cargo ton loaded
in a 40 foot container. [Ref. 8]
The same is true for the movement of containers by rail.
The deregulation of intermodal traffic under the Staggers
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Act allowed the railroads to enter into competition with
the trucking industry for the movement of containers.
Because of standard railcar configuration, the optimum load
is two 40 foot containers. The loading of four 20 foot
containers per fiatcar is not feasible because the weight
of tne loaded containers will exceed -che maximum allowable
payload weight of the fiatcar. Shippers are finding, therefor,
that costs are higher per cargo ton for 20 foot containers
than they are lor 40 foot containers moved by rail.
[Ref. 34:pp. 51-52]
It is imperative that shippers watch closely all costs
incurred in the process of moving their product to market,
as the total of these costs contribute to the final cost
of their product. The greater these costs, the higher the
market price must be in order to ensure receipt of desired
profit. Sensitivity to transportation costs is crucial
if desired profit margins are to be realized.
Ocean shipping costs have also contributed to the trend
towards the larger container. Because many rates are based
on actual tonnage shipped, it is in many cases cheaper per
ton of cargo shipped if 40 foot containers are used. The
cargo handling costs involved in the use of 20 foot con-
tainers are double those for 40 foot containers. And lastly,
because the tariff rates are based on what the market will
bear over specific trade routes, ship owners themselves
are discriminating against the use of the small containers.
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In order to avoid getting "stuck" with a backlog of containers
on one end of a route, for example, the tariffs are set
so as to discourage the shipper from using the less popular
sized containers [Ref. 26].
Another factor influencing the trend towards the 40
foot container is the cargo itself. Commercial cargo tends
to be what is considered cube cargo; that is, it tends to
use up the cubic capacity of the container before the weight
capacity. The high volume capacity of the larger container
is ideally suited for this type of cargo, particularly since
container tariffs are frequently based on actual tonnage
loaded, rather than container capacity.
As a result of the current strength of the dollar, the
movement of cargo is primarily towards the United States.
Although this means an adverse impact on the nation's balance
of trade, the trend is expected to continue. According
to the Secretary of the Treasury, Donald T. Regan, indica-
tions are that the dollar will maintain its strength through
the rest of this decade. [Ref. 35 :p. 165] Although there
are many who scoff at this optimistic outlook, the migration
of many U.S. manufacturing concerns overseas would indicate
that there are many believers [Ref. 36:pp. 168-169].
The implications are important for the ocean shipping
industry. A strong dollar means increasing imports and
decreasing exports. The American consumer will have the
products of the world market available at prices lower than
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ever. Even if (and there are those who insist it should
be when) the dollar loses its position on the world market,
the American consumer will have developed a taste and a
preference for many of these foreign-made goods. This
consumer preference will be sufficient to create an on-going
demand for many of these goods, despite increasing prices.
As a result, trade will continue to run into the U.S., even
as the dollar loses its value on the world market, and U.S.
goods become competitive on the world markets again.
[Ref. 37:pp. 172-174]
Forecasts from the major U.S. flag shipping companies
indicate that shipments from the Far East are expected to
increase [Refs. 7;26;38]. As the Asian countries continue
to develop their industrial bases, more and more of their
products will find their way into the international markets.
Goods produced by these countries are generally better suited
to the larger containers as they tend to be finished goods.
An indication of this is provided by the apparent success
of the use by American President Lines of 45 foot containers
on its Far East trade routes. [Ref. 20:pp. 59-61]
Currently, the limiting factor on the use of the larger
containers (both the 40 foot and the 45 foot) on the Far
East trade routes are the limitations of many of the roads
[Ref. 26] . However, as the industrial bases of the Asian
countries grow and efforts are made to modernize in accordance
with this growth, efforts to upgrade all aspects of the
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in-country transportation facilities in order to handle
the increased trade and its requirements can be expected
[Ref . 33]
.
Sea Land, with the replacement of its 35 foot container
fleet with 40 foot containers, has already found that the
number of 20 foot containers in use by commercial shippers
has diminished rapidly. On their European and Mid-East
trade routes, so few 20 foot containers are being booked
by shippers that cargo planners have limited available space
to deck stowage. The result is that at most, only 20 to
30 containers of this size are being run per week on these
routes. [Ref. 7]
B. CURRENT TRENDS IN MILITARY CONTAINERIZATION
Just as in the commercial world, usage of containeriza-
tion by the military has undergone changes since its initial
development. Better understanding of the capabilities and
the potential benefits to be gained from containerization
have resulted in increased use and dependence on the container
for the movement of military cargoes. [Ref. 9: pp. 34-35]
This usage has not been limited to the use of containeriza-
tion for contingency planning, however; the military also
uses containerization for the peacetime resupply of its
forces throughout the world [Ref. 12].
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1 . Peacetime Usage
Recognizing that containerization was going to become
the dominant means of cargo movement within the ocean shipping
industry, DOD determined in the late 1960s that containeriza-
tion would also have a profound effect on military shipping
policy [Ref. 39:p II-N-2]. Since that time, it has been
the expressed policy of DOD to ship all containerizable cargo
in containers [Ref. 10:p. 37]. The result is that almost
90 per cent of military cargo shipped today is shipped in
containers [Ref. 40:pp. 1-3].
In the implementing of this policy, DOD relies heavily
on the use of commercially owned containers and on the
commercial shipping lines of the U.S. [Ref. 10:p. 37].
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) , as DOD ' s single manager
for sealift and ocean transportation, is responsible for
the coordination with the ocean shippers for the movement
of DOD cargo [Ref. 9:p. 35]. Until recently, MSC also moved
DOD cargo in Navy-owned and chartered assets over many routes
where commercial shipping was available; this was done,
not as a means of providing competition for commercial
operators, but in order to exercise those assets in peacetime.
However, current MSC policy dictates that, if commercial
shipping is available, it will be utilized, even at the
expense of under-utilization of Navy assets. The result
is a further increase in the miltiary utilization of
commercial assets. [Ref. 41]
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Commercial resources, however, are not available to
meet all of DOD ' s shipping requirements. For those locations
where commercial service is not available, MSC provides
service through the use of Navy-owned or chartered ships
and containers. Prior to 1984, this service was provided
with MILVANs owned by the Army. Part of the original
purchase of MILVANs made in the 1960s, these MILVANs were
recalled by DARCOM and were replaced by commercial 20 foot
containers under the terms of a lease-option to buy contract.
The 680 containers procured for this pool are used to provide
resupply to Antarctica, the Arctic, Wake Island, and Diego
Garcia. [Ref. 12]
Additionally, the MILVANs equipped with ammunition
restraints that were procured by the Army in its initial
purchase of containers made in the 1960s remain today the
only containers authorized for the transport of ammunition.
Because commercial shippers are prohibited from carrying
ammunition in the quantities required by the military for
the resupply of even routine peacetime needs, the military
must provide assets for the shipment of its ammunition.
[Ref. 10 :p. 34] Using traditional break bulk vessels and
MILVANs, military ammunition is shipped on a regular basis
from military ammunition ports on the U.S. East and West
Coasts to overseas locations [Ref. 16].
Containers currently considered to be part of the
military's inventory of transportation assets are 20 foot
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containers [Ref. 42:pp. 1-1 - 1-12]. The military, when
using its own containers is not faced with a decision as
to size in regards to container utilization. This is not
true, however, for the majority of the cargo shipped by
the military for peacetime resupply. When booked to commercial
carriers, resupply cargo is carried in commercial containers
and is treated the same as commercial cargo [Ref. 8]
.
When using these commercial carriers, the military is
faced with the same cost considerations and constraints
commercial shippers face as concerns container size selection.
As a result of line haul costs, port handling costs and
cargo handling costs, the military is finding that the 40
foot container offers in many cases the cheapest per-cargo-
ton mode of transportation. [Ref. 8] In view of this cost
efficiency, the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)
,
which is the agency assigned the responsibility as DOD '
s
single manager for military traffic, land transportation,
common-user ocean terminals, and intermodal containers,
has promulgated guidance to military shippers which stresses
the importance of selection of the most cost efficient size
of container. [Ref. 43]
MTMC, who for many years equated efficient container
utilization with the percentage of container capacity used,
now recognizes that true efficiency is a result of per ton
costs. As a result, MTMC guidance to shippers now recommends
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the use of 40 foot containers over 20 foot containers,
particularly when linehaul and handling charges are considered
[Ref. 43]
The result is that more and more of the cargo booked
by the military to commercial shippers is being moved in
40 foot containers, rather than in 20 foot and 35 foot
containers [Ref. 43]. According to American President Lines,
DOD has reduced its use of 20 foot containers booked to
the Far East from approximately 1000 per month to current
approximations of less than 300 per month [Ref. 26].
2 . Contingency Planning
Early in the 1970s it became obvious to military
planners that break bulk shipping would not be available
in the numbers required for contingency resupply. For the
military, containerization use in wartime presents unique
problems, solutions for which must be found. Peacetime
use of container assets is far different than that to be
experienced during contingency. [Ref. 39: pp. II-N-2 - II-N-3]
The first problem that the military planner is confronted
with is the type of cargo that the military must move within
the context of a contingency scenario. Military equipment
tends to be much heavier than does commercial cargo. In
addition, military cargo is not of uniform size; rather,
it tends to be large and oddly shaped. Examples of this
cargo are tanks, ammunition, and field equipment; items
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of this type bear little resemblance to the nice, neat
packages that commercial shippers are accustomed to dealing
with
.
Heavy cargo tends to reach container weight limitations
before reaching the cubic capacity limitations of the con-
tainer. Small containers, with their higher weight to cubic
capacity ratio tend to be more efficient for military
purposes. A 20'x8'x8 , 6" container can carry 20,320 pounds
maximum weight according to International Standards Organiza-
tion standards, while a 40'x8'x8 l container can carry a
maximum of 30,480 pounds [Ref. 22:p. 74]. Weight to cubic
capacity ratios are 15.9 pounds per cubic foot for the 20
foot container and 11.9 pounds per cubic foot for the 40
foot containers. As an example of the military weight to
cubic capacity ratio, ammunition can only be loaded one
layer deep in containers, regardless of the size of container
selected. If a 20 foot container is used, the container
floor will be completely filled. However, this is not true
of the 40 foot container. Military plans regarding the
contingency movement of ammunition are, therefore, all geared
around the use of 20 foot containers. [Ref. 16]
The Army is required, as a result of contingency plans
currently in existence, to maintain ammunition and containers
sufficient to meet the demands anticipated for the first
three days of contingency operations. This means, for
example, that 3000 MILVANs must be available at all times
51
for loading of ammunition out of the military ammunition
port of Sunny Point. The assets to meet this requirement
are those MILVANs that were procured as a result of the
Army's initial purchase of containers in the 1960s. [Ref. 44;
But ammunition accounts for only a small portion of
the material that will be needed in the event of contingency
Current contingency plans call for 95 per cent of the needed
cargo to move by sealift [Ref. 45:p. 29]. It is estimated
that 60 per cent of the supplies needed for the secondary
phase of "amphibious lift," the follow on assault, will
be moved via sealift [Ref. 45:p. 38]. Reinforcement and
resupply shipping for a NATO contingency would have to move
an estimated 11 million tons of military cargo from the
United States alone. This estimate does not include the
fuel that would have to be moved (17 million tons) or the
amount of equipment and supplies that would have to be moved
from Great Britain to the continent. [Ref. 2:p. 39]
These are only estimates of the amounts of cargo that
would have to be moved. Until such time as a contingency
actually occurs, there is no way of knowing how accurate
these estimates are. Regardless of the accuracy of these
estimates, commercial assets of containers and vessels will
have to be available to move the vast majority of this cargo
[Ref. 17:p. 6] .
Utilization of commercial containers and vessels becomes
the first of a group of major problems. The commercial
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shipping industry is gradually moving away from the break
bulk vessels that are so admirably suited to military
operations. Because of their ability to carry items of
almost any size or weight, as well as their ability to be
self sustaining , break bulk vessels are well suited to oper-
ations virtually anywhere in the world. However, as the
commercial world has expanded its use of containerization,
the number of break bulk vessels in the world shipping fleets
have decreased. In the U.S. flag fleet, for example, break
bulk ships have decreased from 123 in 1978 [Ref. 46:pp. 23-24]
to 86 in 1982 [Ref. 47:pp. 12-13]. This compares to the
growth of containerships in the U.S. flag fleet from 163
in 1978 to 242 in 1982 [Ref. 48:p. 28]. The result is that
the majority of vessels available to the military for
contingency resupply will be commercial container ships.
The military has recognized the implications of this
and has begun looking at means of adapting commercial ships
to fit the need of military cargo. Through the development
of "customized" containers, such as flatracks and seasheds
,
the military anticipates being able to carry otherwise non-
containerizable cargo on commercial container ships.
[Ref. 49:p. 68]
Flatracks, which are of the same length and width as
standard containers, have end frames which fold inward for
stacking. Designed to provide a framework around cargo
that is not easily containerized, flatracks enable containers
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to be stacked above and below them. [Ref. 49 :p. 68] Best
described as platforms, the military currently owns six
units; there are no plans to purchase additional units,
however, as it has been determined that sufficient units
can be obtained from commercial container leasing companies
[Ref. 42:p. 1-5]
.
The sea shed unit is nothing more than a large open-
topped box. Measuring 40 feet long and 25 feet wide, it
fits into the space normally required for several 40 foot
containers. The steel floor in the sea shed is hinged and
can act as a hatchway, providing access to the units stacked
beneath it. A series of sea sheds loaded next to one another
serves as a large, flexible "tweendecks" stowage area.
Designed to handle heavy and outsized military cargo, such
as vehicles and aircraft, the sea shed project has not yet
been completed. [Ref. 49:p. 68]
The second major problem faced by the military in the
utilization of commercial container ships in a wartime
scenario is the requirement for the specialized equipment
necessary for lifting containers on and off containerships
[Ref. 49:p. 68]. All major ports in the world have cargo
handling gear pierside, alleviating the necessity for
containerships to be self-sustaining. Because of the tremen-
dous expense involved in the purchase and installation of
such equipment on-board these vessels, ship owners are
naturally reluctant to install such equipment if it does
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not prove necessary for vessel operations. [Ref. 15:p. 13]
As a result, the majority of the containerships constructed
in the last few years are not self-sustaining, a trend that
shows no signs of changing [Ref. 50].
In the event of a contingency, however, there is no
guarantee that ports where the cargo will be off-loaded
will have sophisticated cargo handling equipment in place
or operational. The location chosen may be nothing more
than a beachhead and may not be a port at all. If so, it
will be necessary to have available means to unload containers
from the vessels while in the stream. Cranes will have
to be available that are capable of lifting containers from
the vessels onto barges, pontoons, or temporary piers.
The Army has been working on this problem since the
early 1970s. The Over-the-Shore Discharge of Containerships
(OSDOC) program, as well as the Logistics-Over-the-Shore
(LOTS) and Container Off-Loading and Transfer System (COTS)
tests have all been attempts by the military to develop
methods of handling the discharge of containers under less
than favorable conditions [Ref. 51:p. 77]. While an ideal
system has not yet been developed, a thorough understanding
and appreciation of the problems to be faced with such an
operation have been gained.
The craneship modification program, which is being carried
out by the Maritime Administration under the auspices of
the Navy, will provide a partial solution for the problem
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of off-loading non-self sustaining containerships . Designed
to be a part of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) of the National
Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) , the 11 ships scheduled for
conversion under this program will be modified by the
installation of large marine cranes. Their primary mission
will be to unload ships brought alongside. These craneships
,
which are designated as T-ACS ships, will carry their
own lighters and causeway sections, as well as military
cargo. [Ref. 49:p. 68]
A third problem faced by the military planners is the
source of the containers required. Although a pool of con-
tainers owned by U.S. flag shippers and lessors has been
identified, it is difficult to estimate how adequate this
pool will be in terms of meeting the contingency requirments.
Under optimal conditions, this pool of containers will be
available exactly as required by the military; there is
no guaranteeing this availability either in terms of numbers
or location. Additionally, the problem of controlling and
guaranteeing the make-up of that pool in terms of desired
container size presents problems for military planners
[Ref. 32]
.
Up to this point, all discussion of container size has
been in regard to cargo requirements. It must be pointed
out that not all ships can carry all sizes of containers.
Vessels designed to carry containers of a specific size,
such as 20 foot or 35 foot, are not always capable of
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carrying a variety of container sizes. And even though
the popular belief is that vessels designed to carry 40
foot containers can always carry 20 foot containers, this
is simply not so [Ref. 16]. Modification of container cells
or the coupling of two 20 foot containers, although minor
in terms of material and time required, in a time of con-
tingency can prove to be extremely difficult to accomplish.
Military planners must be aware of such modification require-
ments and plan accordingly.
Once again, however, it must be remembered that only
estimates can be developed. Not until the actual require-
ments are known can any kind of certainty be felt in regards
to the forecasts of contingency requirements. It is imperative
that military planners ensure the issue of container avail-
ability be addressed in detail, not just in terms of gross
numbers required.
The movement of containers once ashore presents another
problem that must be resolved prior to any contingency.
It is unlikely that containers will be discharged on the
beach. Transport will be necessary. Because containers
are designed to be transported on trailers of some type,
contingency planners must also plan for their availability.
Once again, the size of containers that are available must
be taken into consideration when developing requirements
for trailers.
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Sufficient quantities of tractors and trailers in the
appropriate mix of sizes will do little good, however, if
sufficient and adequate cargo handling equipment is not
available ashore to lift those containers on and off of
the trailers. Military planners must take care that con-
sideration is given to the maximum load weights and container
dimensions that may be encountered in the pool of containers
that will be available for contingency use to ensure that
cargo handling equipment ashore will be adequate.
Containers, once loaded, are easily moved over the road
or via rail. In a wartime scenario, however, just as there
is no guarantee of the existence of ports or of pierside
container cranes, there is no guarantee that road or rail
facilities will exist. In order to meet the need for which
they have been loaded, the containers must be gotten to
the battle lines or designated resupply areas. Tractors,
trailers and cargo handling equipment are all critical if
the containers are to arrive at their designated destinations
These items must be available in sufficient numbers and
must be capable of handling containers of varying size and
weight.
It can be argued that the old CONEX box was and still
is the ideal container size for the movement of troop equip-
ent under wartime conditions. These small containers
(6'3"x6 , 10 ,, x4 , 3 M and 6 ' 3 "x6 ' 10"x8 ' 6 " ) are easily transported
over rough terrain and can be moved by a troop unit using
58
its standard field transportation equipment. The only method
available for moving them on the containerships that will
be available for contingency resupply is to load them into
commercial containers and unload them once they are ashore.
However, problems inherent to the use of containerization
and commercial containerships will still exist.
C. MILITARY REQUIREMENTS AND TRENDS AS COMPARED TO CURRENT
COMMERCIAL TRENDS
The trends in military development and use of container-
ization, while designed to increase the use of commercial
containers and ships by the military, have tended to be
geared primarily towards customizing container design for
military usage. Although the military has moved towards
the use of the 40 foot container in peacetime for shipping
by commercial means, it has not looked closely at the larger
container in terms of its own peacetime container resupply
system nor has it fully explored the use of the larger con-
tainer for wartime use. [Ref. 25] Having developed and
used the 20 foot container successfully, the military appears
to have decided that it will stay with that size container
[Ref. 42: 1-2 - 1-3]
.
This decision, while based on experience, must be
reevaluated in terms of the current trends in containeriza-
tion occurring in the commercial sector. Only if sufficient
numbers of 20 foot containers are available, to say nothing
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of the vessels required to move those containers, can the
military say that larger containers are of no value for
military operations.
Rather than looking at the larger containers, the military
has concerned itself with designing and developing specialized
containers to solve the problems inherent in the movement
of its outsized and oddly shapped equipment by commercial
assets [Ref. 49:p. 68]. Because the military recognizes
that containerships will constitute the majority of the
fleet of commercial vessels that will be available for use
during a contingency, the decision has been made to develop
systems that will ensure their adaptability to military
needs
.
In the process of this, many military planners have
failed to keep an eye on what is happening within the
commercial ocean shipping industry. The movement towards
the larger container would appear to have passed unnoticed
by these planners. Even though the commercial shippers
are increasing the numbers of large containers in their
fleets, military planners continue to talk 20 foot contain-
ers. In fact, during discussions with military container
and cargo people, the response was overwhelming in assurance
that the 20 foot container would remain the contingency
container. Not only that, but it was repeatedly heard that
there was no need for the military to concern itself with
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the possibility of a commercial trend toward larger con-
tainers, if in fact such a trend exists. [Ref. 44;25;12]
The assumption seems to be that, because the military
prefers the 20 foot container, the commercial carriers will
continue to make them available in the quantities required
by the military for contingency operations. The military
belief would appear to be that the commercial shippers have
a responsibility, in fact, to ensure that these containers
remain in sufficient quantities simply because the military
prefers them.
On the commercial side of the house, this feeling
apparently does not exist. As the costs for moving and
handling cargo continue to rise, expectations of commercial
container owners are that the costs for the use of the 20
foot containers will also continue to rise. [Refs. 7; 26; 38]
As they do, their popularity with commercial shippers will
continue to decline. As this happens and as it becomes
necessary for container owners to replace their 20 foot
containers, the logical decision will be to replace them
with the size for which there is more shipper demand.
Recognizing the popularity of the larger container,
ship owners will, when the time comes to construct new
vessels, opt for those designed to carry the larger contain-
ers, just as they are currently doing. Ports, as they
observe this continuing trend towards larger containers,
in order to remain competitive and in order to ensure their
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ability to handle the larger containers, will purchase equip-
ment designed to handle the larger containers. Equipment
manufacturers, who must respond to customer needs if they
are to remain competitive, will stock and deal in those
pieces of equipment that are capable of meeting the increased
needs of these larger containers.
D. IMPLICATIONS OF THESE DISCREPANCIES
The implications here are clear. First of all, because
of the trend of the commercial sector to move away from
the 20 foot container, the military may not have 20 foot
containers available for its use in the event of contingency.
Although the 40 foot container is not the best suited size
for military operations, particularly in view of the con-
ditions that can be reasonably expected in a wartime scenario,
the military must be aware of and be capable of dealing
with the assets that will be available to it in the event
of a contingency. This is particularly true since the U.S.
military must rely heavily on commercial sealift assets.
Secondly, even though those ports currently served by
the military containerization system (Antarctica, the Arctic,
Wake Island and Diego Garcia) are constrained to the use
of the 20 foot containers as a result of their current port
structure, the possibility exists that in the not so distant
future these ports may have the capability of handling larger
containers. It may also prove to be more efficient for
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their operations for these locations to accept the larger
containers. Military cargo handling equipment must be
replaced eventually; even military piers and ports do require
and do receive updating and modernization. In time, because
commercial equipment will have the capability to handle
the larger containers, the military will find itself paying
for capability that it may not be able to use.
Military planners have, in the past five years, been
presented with the dangers that can arise from complacency
and a failure to consider all aspects in regards to contingency
resupply planning. The implications of the Falkland Islands
Crisis alone should have taught the military the necessity
of keeping its collective mind open to all possibilities,
particularly regarding the commercial shipping sector.
It is a well recognized fact that it is from them that the
assets necessary for successful operation of resupply shipping
must come. Of what use will those assets be if the military
has failed to keep abreast of the trends in their development?
E. SUMMARIZATION OF CURRENT TRENDS IN CONTAINERIZATION
It would be hard to argue that current trends in commercial
containerization are not towards the 40 foot container;
to the contrary, all indicators, both economic factors and
equipment design, point to a growing preference for the
larger container on the part of both the commercial shipper
and the vessel owners. Although military cargo planners
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have justification for their preference for the 20 foot
container, it is imperative that, as discussed on pages
60 and 61 of this thesis, they recognize this trend within
the commercial sector. More importantly, it is imperative
that the military recognize the implications of that trend
as concerns contingency and future peacetime container
operations
.
Given that the military has limited resources but must
prepare for all possible contingency situations based solely
on estimates as to requirements for resupply and equipment,
it would appear to be advantageous if a study were performed
which would provide indications of just what the impact
of the trends within the commercial ocean shipping industry
would be on the miltiary's plans for future operations.
Only if the miltiary is aware of what the implications of
these trends in regards to their plans would be, can an
appropriate line of action be determined.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the prior discussion concerning the depen-
dence of the military on commercial assets for peacetime
and wartime resupply operations, it is imperative that DOD
maintain an awareness of trends within the commercial indus-
try. Awareness of trends will enable DOD to forecast the
impact such trends will have on its plans and operations.
Through the forecasting of the impact of trends, DOD will
be able to recognize possible equipment shortfalls and will
be in a position to take responsive action.
It is recommended, therefore, that DOD conduct a study
designed to assess the impact of the trend by the commercial
ocean shipping industry to move toward the use of the 4
foot container as the dominant container length. This study
should be designed to evaluate the future capability of the
military to use the 40 foot container in both its peacetime
resupply operations and its planned wartime resupply oper-
ations. In addition, the study should attempt to determine
at what point in the future the impact of the trend towards
the 40 foot container will be felt by the military in the
performance of its planned operations.
Such a study should not be considered as a solution in
itself. It should be regarded simply as a means of provid-
ing a forecast. The results of such a study must be analysed;
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the analysis of the study results will provide military
planners with a tool to be used in the determination of and
appropriate response.
DOD may not, however, feel that such a study is a necessary
part of the effort required to assess the implications of the
trend towards the 40 foot container. Evaluation of current
action on the part of U.S. flag shippers may indicate to
military planners that such a study is not necessary. Within
the context of this chapter, two alternative solutions are
presented and discussed. However, it is recommended that a
study of the type proposed be implemented prior to any
discussion of possible plans of action.
Before DOD can embark on a discussion of plans of action
regarding possible container shortfalls, military planners
must assess the impact such a trend in the commercial industry
could have on military operations from the standpoint of ship
and container availability, container handling capability,
compatibility with cargo requirements and shortfalls of cargo
handling equipment that may result from such a trend. In
effect, it is necessary for military planners to develop as
accurately as possible forecasts of the military's ability
to deal with the implications of such a trend.
A. GENERAL STUDY DESIGN
As presented in the introduction to this chapter, the
recommended course of action is the conduct of a study de-
signed to assess the impact of the trend towards 40 foot
containers on military peacetime and wartime resupply
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operations. The study, which will forecast the future impli-
cations of this trend, should cover a period of approximately
20 years. This period of time has been selected in order to
provide a sufficiently long forecast so that action may be
taken by DOD to correct shortfalls the study may indicate.
It must be recognized that such a study, concerned as it is
with future plans and estimates, can only be considered to
be an estimate in itself. Nevertheless, even as commercial
industry estimates future needs and develops strategic plans
based on those estimated needs, so, too, must the military
project for future requirements. The overall design of the
study is as shown in Figure 4
.
As part of the assessment of the impact of the trend
towards the 4 foot container, the study must determine the
ability of the military to utilize the 40 foot container in
its resupply operations. This determination must be based
on the availability of equipment capable of handling con-
tainers of this size, as well as the compatibility of mili-
tary cargo with container characteristics. Additionally,
any restrictions that may exist or be expected to exist
within port structures must be carefully considered for their
impact on operations using the larger container.
The question of efficiency must be dealt with in terms
of the impact the 40 foot container will have on efficient
utilization of assets. Results of the study should provide
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can be expected to impact on military operations. Addition-
ally, the study should provide an indication of how that
impact will manifest itself.
It is recommended that such a study be conducted in two
parts; the first will concern the impact of the trend on
military operated peacetime container resupply of Antarctica,
the Arctic, Wake Island, and Diego Garcia, and the second
will concern the impact of this trend on resupply in contin-
gency. Both studies would require the establishment of a
baseline based on currently existing capabilities and port
structures. Through analysis of currently assigned missions
and current contingency plans, future requirements and an-
ticipated changes can be forcasted.
Both studies would be conducted along similar lines in
regards to development of future growth and development.
Because the analysis results must reflect container flow
rates and any restrictions that may exist, the studies must
examine all factors that may impact on these flow rates.
These factors should include such things as container utili-
zation rates, vessel availability, cargo handling equipment
capabilities, port structure, transportation infrastructure,
and container handling capabilities. It must be stressed
that there will exist, for each port or location examined,
characteristics that may impact on container operations.
Examples include such things as environmental factors, port
structure and transportation infrastructure limitations.
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These characteristics must be carefully evaluated for impact
on planned operations.
Those ports currently served by military container
service for peacetime resupply are also vital for contingency
operations. It is recommended, therefore, that the study of
peacetime container operations be completed prior to the
start of the study of contingency operations.
1 . Study of Peacetime Container Operations
In the conduct of a study designed to assess the
impact of 40 foot containers on the peacetime resupply of
Antarctica, the Arctic, Wake Island, and Diego Garcia, it
is imperative that the concept of future operations be kept
in mind. Current port structure and capabilities, in many
cases, prohibit the use of anything larger than the 20 foot
containers currently in use. In some cases, Antarctica for
example, current equipment capabilities are often strained
even in the handling of containers of this size [Ref. 52].
However, it must be kept in mind that these problems exist
as a result of current port or equipment capabilities.
Future mission demands may indicate the need for expansion
and upgrade of existing activity structure and capabilities.
It is necessary that the future needs of these locations be
identified.
The data that will provide the baseline of this portion
of the study concerns the current status of resupply opera-
tions for each of the four ports. Data must include all
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information concerning port structure, as well as actual
resupply requirements as they currently exist. It is im-
perative that the information gathered be as complete and
as detailed as possible. Figure 5 provides a possible format
Information about the current port structure can be
divided into three categories; the first is that concerning
the physical structure of the port itself; the second is
that concerning the capabilities of the port and receiving
activity; the third is that regarding the local infrastruc-
ture as it impacts on the movement of containers (Figure 6).
The information to be gathered concerning the physical
structure of the port itself should include such things as
harbor depth and availability of moorings, number and type
of piers available, depth of water at pier(s) , number and
length of berths available at pier(s), as well as any re-
strictions that might impact on container operations.
The information required concerning port capabilities
is somewhat more involved, as it must include data on all
aspects of container handling. This includes information
on everything from the equipment that is currently available
for use to the amount of area available for container mar-
shalling. It is necessary that detailed listings of cargo
handling gear be developed, to include types of equipment
available, how many of each, exact capabilities in terms of
container handling (e.g., size, reach, weight capacity), age
































































































































































Figure 6. Port Characteristics
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non-mobile pieces of equipment, as well as exact explanations
of any restrictions or limitations that might exist for the
use of this equipment. All information available concerning
those areas designated for container receipt or marshalling,
including the size of the area and current system used for
the storage of containers must be obtained.
Additionally, it is necessary to develop complete in-
ventories of tractors and chassis available for the movement
of containers from the site of discharge to receipt locations.
All equipment used by the receiving activity must be inven-
toried; data should include age, condition and capabilities.
Again, any restrictions or limitations that may exist as a
result of equipment currently in use should be noted.
Information must be obtained regarding the structure
of the road system over which the containers are moved. This
should include such things as restrictions on weight, length
and height of load moved. Road surface and construction
should be discussed, particularly as it may impact on weight
limitations
.
Once all of this information has been gathered, it is
necessary to obtain an evaluation of the capability of
current port structure, equipment and infrastructure to
handle current resupply requirements. This information,
which should be in terms of container flow rates, needs to
be detailed for each step in the process of handling and
moving containers. Flow rates for discharge, port processing,
movement through the port, loading on trailers, movement to
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receiving activity - all must be developed. It is these flow
rates that will be used to determine the efficiency of
current container operations. Particular attention must be
given to limitations or restrictions that currently exist
that may impact on flow rates currently existing in the move-
ment of 20 foot containers.
These flow rates, which should be those currently used
by cargo operations personnel for planning purposes, should
be provided in terms of containers handled per hour, as well
as measurement tons moved per hour. Data should be obtained
for both actual rate and for estimated maximum capability.
In those cases where maximum capability and actual flow rates
are not in agreement, the cause for discrepancy must be noted
The best source for this information will be from the
military activity assigned the responsibility for port opera-
tion in each of the four locations. Because of changing
physical conditions and the often idiosyncratic nature of
local operations, the information obtained from those indi-
viduals who must deal with resupply operations on a day to
day basis will be more accurate than that obtained from
fleet commanders or port descriptions that may not be up to
date
.
All data concerning current port structure and container
handling capability must be evaluated in terms of capability
of handling 40 foot containers. Additionally, projected
flow rates must be developed for the movement of 40 foot
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containers. It is recommended that International Standards
Organization Technical Committee 104 (ISOTC 104) standards
be used, except where further restrictions exist as a result
of limitations imposed by either the point of origin of the
cargo or the destination port itself.
The next grouping of current data that must be gathered
concerns the current resupply requirements. This data which
is available from the appropriate supply department/activity
at each of the locations, must be broken down as to the
following detailed categories: total quantity of cargo pro-
grammed for delivery in the current year (long ton and measure-
ment ton) ; specific identification of requirements in terms
of commodity, quantity and unit weight and cube; frequency
of required resupply and breakdown by commodity type and
amount included in each resupply activity; and a listing of
all commodities required that are considered unsuitable for
container iz at ion.
The number of 20 foot containers programmed for delivery
with each resupply operation needs to be obtained, along with
projected contents and stowage of each. This information,
which can be obtained from the supply depot providing resupply
support for the destination location, should then be analysed
for suitability of stowage in 40 foot containers. With the
use of a computer program, projected stowage in 4 foot con-
tainers can be developed. Once this is done, the total num-
ber of 40 foot containers required, as well as container
utilization rates, can be obtained for each resupply action.
The total number required and utilization rates with 40 foot
containers should then be compared to the same information
for 20 foot containers; any deficiencies that may result, as
well as any improvements in efficiency, from the use of one
size container or the other should be noted.
Once all of the current information has been obtained,
it is necessary to look to projections of future operations
and resupply requirements. This portion of the study will
also be divided into two sections, the first concerning port
structure and the second concerning resupply requirements.
Anticipated growth and increased mission requirements must
be carefully evaluated in terms of impact on existing port
structure, cargo handling capability, and equipment require-
ments. Identification of requirements for upgrade of existing
facilities and/or replacement of existing equipment must be
evaluated in terms of impact on future throughput capabilities
The impact on future throughput should be evaluated in
terms of both the 20 foot containers and the 40 foot con-
tainers. Requirements for equipment upgrades, for example,
should be evaluated in terms of capability of handling the
larger containers as well as those currently in use. Upgrades
or changes to existing road limitations must also be eval-
uated in terms of impact on the movement of the 4 foot
containers, as well as for the currently used 20 foot size.
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As a result of evaluation of future growth or projected
changes to port structure and local infrastructure, flow rates
should be developed for both the 20 foot and for the 40 foot
containers. These flow rates will be used to compare the
efficiency of future operations using either size of
container.
The data necessary for this section of the study is
best obtained from fleet commanders. Projected plans, as
well as analysis of future needs within their areas of cog-
nizance will provide the best estimates of future mission
requirements. Additionally, projected Programmed Objectives
Memorandum (POM) submissions will detail expected expansions
of mission statements of fleet commanders who will in turn
be able to translate these into changes to the mission state-
ments of each of the locations under evaluation.
Future resupply requirements can be developed as a result
of projected changes and/or growth of mission statements.
These requirements, which need to be developed in the same
detail as that provided for current requirements, must be
evaluated in terms of both 20 foot and 40 foot containers.
This information, which can be obtained from fleet commanders,
will be in the form of estimates. As such, care must be taken
that growth rates used are consistent with projected changes
in mission statements.
The final group of data necessary for this study is that
regarding vessel capability and availability (Figure 7)
.
Again projections of shipping estimates that will be available
78
VARIABLE ATTRIBUTE MEASURE
MSC ships Cargo configuration
Cargo handling




























* m/t - measurement tons
1/t - long tons
Figure 7. Assets Available
79
for use in conjunction with the military resupply of these
locations must be developed. This information, which can be
obtained from the Military Sealift Command (MSC) , will be
the result of industry survey and future projections of
commercial requirements. In order to provide data for
efficiency comparisons, capabilities for handling both 20
foot and 40 foot containers must be developed in terms of
flow rates and total ship stowage capability.
The recommended format for the study of peacetime con-
tainer operations is that of a computer generated spread
sheet. By using this type of format, evaluation of the data
will be simplified as all data will be displayed in similar
format. All data concerning future projections in terms of
port structure and capability and resupply requirements, as
well as container assets necessary to deliver those require-
ments, will be available in terms of both 20 foot and 40
foot containers.
Evaluation of the data gathered will be based on de-
termining at what point in the future, as a result of mission
requirements and resulting upgrading of capabilities or
simple replacement of existing equipment and facilities as
a result of obsolescence, it will be more efficient for the
required resupply to be conducted utilizing 40 foot containers
The point of efficiency will occur when better utilization of
containers, equipment, and facility structures can be achieved
using the larger container. This point of efficiency can
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best be defined as greater utilization of container capacity,
vessel capacity, and greater flowrates resulting from one
size container as opposed to the other. It can be expected,
for example, that best utilization of containers, equipment
and existing structure can be obtained with the 20 foot con-
tainers now in use. Cargo quantities, equipment, capabilities
and port structure in all four locations are geared towards
the use of the 20 foot container. At some point in the
future, however, it can reasonably be anticipated that this
will change.
Analysis of the information obtained and the flowrates
developed for both size containers may indicate, for example,
at what point cargo handling equipment will be deficient in
terms of reduced throughput of containers. This information
will also indicate at what point in the future flowrates
could be increased as a result of improvements in infrastruc-
ture. The value of this information is that it will provide
military planners with projections of future need in terms
of changes to existing peacetime container resupply operations
2 . Study of Contingency Container Operations
The first step in the development of this second
major study is to determine what ports and locations military
planners have identified for contingency resupply operations.
Caution must be exercised in this, as the information to be
used in many cases will simply be estimates or vague pro-
jections of possible operations. However, in order to fully
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study the impact of the trend towards the 4 foot container,
it is necessary that all possibilities of military contin-
gency operations be thoroughly examined. It is anticipated
that the list will be quite lengthy and that discrepancies
regarding discharge locations will be found in the process
of gathering the necessary data. Identification of these
discharge ports and locations will come from contingency
plans, the evaluation of those plans by fleet commanders,
and projected changes as a result of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) prepared Joint Strategic Planning Document.
As in the development of the peacetime portion of this
study, it is necessary to collect pertinent data concerning
existing port structure and capabilities. It is recommended
that this information be gathered from a variety of sources,
including current reports issued by port authorities, reports
from owners of vessels calling those ports, as well as mil-
itary reports on current structure and capabilities.
Again, as with the peacetime portion of this study,
information concerning port structure should be divided into
two sections, that concerning the actual physical structure
of the port and that concerning the capabilities of the port
regarding containerization. All data gathered should be as
detailed as possible, as this data will provide the baseline
for this portion of the study.
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The next step in this study is to gather all available
data concerning the movement of containers, not only through
the port itself, but also in-country. Road capabilities,
limitations and specific details concerning terrain are per-
tinent. If contingency plans specify receipt locations or
activities, all details concerning container movement and
handling capabilities must also be gathered for these lo-
cations as well. The idea is to develop, in detail,
information as to capabilities and flowrates, as complete
a picture as possible of container operations for all con-
tingency scenarios.
Once this information has been gathered, it is necessary
to develop data concerning future development and operations
for each of these locations. This information, which will
be based on forecasts of future need as perceived by port
authorities and fleet commanders (as concerns receipt activi-
ties) , must be gathered from a variety of sources. Port
authorities, while an excellent source, may not always have
the complete picture concerning future requirements or trends
in activity. Analysis of the port country's economy and
trade forecasts, as well as analysis of past activity and
growth rates, will all be necessary in order to provide as
accurate a picture as possible. Additionally, military in-
telligence reports and analyses will help to round out the
information obtained.
The most critical element in this portion of the study
is to ensure that forecasts of future development, construc-
tion, and capabilities are as accurate as possible. It is
vital that data collected not be overly optimistic in nature;
however, credence must be given to forecasts of future growth.
It is for this reason that information must be collected from
as wide a variety of sources as possible.
All information concerning container handling and move-
ment capabilities should be expressed in terms of size of
container handled. For instance, if the current port struc-
ture is geared around 35 foot containers and there is no
existing capability for the handling of 40 foot containers,
this fact must be noted. Flowrates, expressed in terms of
discharge and terminal throughput, should be noted for all
container sizes available.
Once all data concerning port structure and container
handling capabilities have been gathered, data concerning
resupply requirements must also be obtained. This infor-
mation which will come fron contingency plans, should be
carefully reviewed to ensure that requirements are realistic
and are based on recent projections. Data regarding require-
ments should be gathered in much the same format as that
gathered for the peacetime portion of this study; total re-
quirements are needed, but should be broken down to item
description, weight, number required, suitability for con-
tainerization , and cube. In addition, load port and projected
required delivery dates are necessary.
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This data should then be analysed for ideal container-
ization stowage. Stow plans should be developed for optimum
mix, using both 20 foot containers and 40 foot containers.
Number of containers required, container utilization rates,
and container load weight should be developed for all cargo
requirements. This information should be developed for use
with 20 foot containers as well as with the 40 foot size.
Data concerning the availability of military cargo
handling equipment must be obtained. This information should
be grouped according to each specified resupply destination.
In the case of beachheads, it is important that mode of dis-
charge be identified in detail, and that limitations asso-
ciated with that mode of discharge be noted. For instance,
if contingency plans call for the construction of a tempo-
rary pier with weight and width constraints, note must be
made of this. If current military inventories do not include
any floating cranes capable of handling fully loaded 40 foot
containers, this must also be noted.
Along with the data concerning the capabilities of
equipment currently in inventory and designated for contin-
gency use, it is imperative that any plans for the upgrade
of this equipment be noted. Of equal importance is to note
the age of all equipment currently in inventory and to de-
termine if projected replacement or conversion plans exist.
If military planners are currently aware of replacement plans,
details concerning capabilities and limitations of new
equipment should be obtained.
85
This information should not be limited to port container
handling equipment. Rather, information concerning the hand-
ling of containers and cargo once in the field needs to also
be obtained. Type of equipment, number of units, as well as
capabilities must be obtained for each contingency operation
site. The existence of plans to upgrade or to replace al-
ready existing equipment must be analysed to determine
capabilities or limitations of new equipment.
Information concerning vessel availability must be
gathered. This information, which will cover vessels cur-
rently in or projected to be added to the Ready Reserve
Fleet (RRF) , the Strategic Reserve Fleet (SRF) and the
commercial U. S. flag fleet, can best be obtained from the
Maritime Administration (MARAD) and from the Military Sea-
lift Command (MSC) . Commercial ship owners will also be
able to provide information concerning expected additions
and conversions of their present fleets. Again, the data
obtained must include detailed information concerning vessel
capabilities for the handling of containers. If limitations
exist, they must be identified.
The final step is to develop load plans based on cargo
and vessel availability. Container handling and throughput
rates need to be developed for each location designated to
receive resupply cargo. These flowrates should be developed
for delivery of both 20 foot and 40 foot containers.
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Future projections of U. S. flag container fleet inven-
tories and availability should be compared to projected re-
quirements. In all cases where equipment and port structure
capabilities indicate acceptability of accepting and handling
40 foot containers, note whould be made and flowrates de-
termined. Forecasted inventories must be carefully compared
to those projections where port structure or equipment ca-
pabilities limit the container size to 20 foot to ensure
that no shortfalls exist.
Finally, analysis of throughput rates must be performed
to determine whether or not military operations can be im-
proved with the use of 40 foot containers. Part of the
determination of this improvement will include a comparison
of container utilization rates. Consideration must also be
given to flowrates if total efficiency is to be obtained.
In many cases, however, the size of container selected
will be determined purely on the capabilities of the equip-
ment available to off-load and to move the containers to
their ultimate destination. The attention of military plan-
ners should be directed, however, to all instances where
efficiency is best obtained through the use of 40 foot con-
tainers but, as a result of equipment limitations, use is
restricted to 20 foot containers.
3 . Evaluation of Study Results
Once both portions of the study have been analysed
for possible improvements of efficiency as a result of using
40 foot containers, a precise determination of the impact of
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the trend toward 40 foot containers by the commercial indus-
try can be developed. It can be expected, for example, that
as cargo handling equipment is replaced in both the commer-
cial and the military sectors, the equipment selected will
have increased capabilities and will in fact be designed for
the larger containers. The same is true for the composition
of the U. S. flag fleet, from which resupply shipping will
have to come.
The assumption is made that both the military and the
commercial sectors will program periodic upgrades of port
structure; it is logical to assume that these upgrades will
consist, in part, of increasing cargo handling capabilities.
Attention must be paid to determine if these upgrades will
support 40 foot container operations.
Availability of containers will be the final evaluation
point. If forecasts of the U. S. flag container fleet in-
dicate decreasing numbers of 20 foot containers to the point
where there are insufficient numbers available for projected
military resupply requirements, there can be little point in
arguing the impact that the trend towards the 4 foot con-
tainer will have on military operations. The rate at which
commercial container owners intend to replace 20 foot con-
tainers with 40 foot containers will determine the criti-
cality of need for a decision by military planners as to the
development of alternative containerization plans.
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Careful note should be made of the comparison of con-
tainer throughput rates and of container utilization rates
for the two sizes of containers. If indications are that
more efficient cargo operations can be obtained with one
size over the other, military planners should take note of
this and determine whether or not this improved efficiency
may not constitute sufficient impetus to limit military op-
erations to use of one size container or the other.
A prime example of this is time savings. In a contin-
gency situation, time savings can be measured in terms of
lives lost or saved. Study results may indicate that sub-
stantial time may be saved in the delivery of cargo to ulti-
mate destination if 40 foot containers are used. If so,
the savings in time may justify the problems inherent in
using current modes of container handling when dealing with
the larger containers. In the peacetime scenario, the in-
creased efficiency of overall operations to be realized from
the use of 40 foot containers in Antarctica, for instance,
may not be sufficient to offset the difficulties inherent
in upgrading pier capabilities and equipment currently in
use.
It will be the job of the military planners and analysts
to evaluate the results of the proposed study to determine
what tradeoffs DOD can and should make regarding container
size. The object of a study of this type is not to provide
solutions; rather, its object is to provide a process of
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evaluation that will facilitate the formulation of an
appropriate and responsive solution.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Given that the military is willing to acknowledge the
existence of a trend on the part of the commercial ocean
shipping industry to move towards the use of 40 foot containers,
there exits options other than the conduct of a study such as
that which has been developed here. Response alternatives
available to DOD may be classed as the choice of either
pro-active or reactive responses.
1 . Pro-active Response
Choice of this response by the military would indi-
cate a determination on the part of the military planners to
prepare for the results of the indicated trend towards 40
foot containers. This response could take one of two direc-
tions: military planners could determine that, based on the
information currently available to them concerning contin-
gency requirements and the capability of current and fore-
casted equipment, the 20 foot container is the only size
container that will adequately meet military contingency
needs. Recognizing that all equipment currently in the DOD
inventory is capable of handling 20 foot containers, that
all commercial equipment currently in place anywhere in the
world has the capability of handling 20 foot containers at
the very least, this would appear to be a valid conclusion
for military planners to draw. If this decision were made,
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it is recommended that DOD purchase 20 foot containers in
sufficient numbers to meet total forecasted contingency re-
quirements .
The drawbacks to this solution are of two types; the
first is a possible loss of improved container handling
efficiency. If flowrates and container utilization rates
indicate that military operations could be improved as a
result of the larger container, DOD will have sacrificed
these improvements in efficiency because it will have locked
itself into the use of 20 foot containers. Additionally,
the problem of vessel availability arises. Plans will have
to be developed to ensure timely modification of all ships
not designed to carry 2 foot containers.
The second type of problem is the size of the pool or
number of containers. The number of containers identified
as necessary for resupply operations will be a projection.
In the event of a contingency, this pool may prove to be in-
sufficient. If so, military planners will find themselves
with cargo to move and no plans for moving it. Additionally,
the problem of where to put the thousands of containers that
would be in a pool of this type must be dealt with. The ideal
location is close to the load port identified for contingency
use. The question of which contingency must then be answered.
One of the biggest problems is the amount of land that would
be required to provide storage regardless of where they would
eventually be stockpiled.
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The second direction that a pro-active response could
take would be for the military planners to determine that,
as a result of the implications inherent in the trend by the
commercial industry towards the 40 foot container, the military
has little choice in the size of container available for its
use in contingency. In this case, response would be based on
the recognition that commercial assets must be relied on to
provide the major share of both the ships and containers re-
quired to support contingency resupply requirements.
If this determination were made, the recommendation
would be for the military to phase out the use of 20 foot
containers from its contingency plans and to look for develop-
ment of new plans utilizing the 40 foot container. This
solution also has its inherent advantages and disadvantages.
The advantages are assured compatibility with available
commercial assets and guaranteed improved throughput.
But the disadvantages would appear to easily outweigh these
advantages. First of all, there is no guarantee that local
infrastructures and port capabilities will support 40 foot
containers in all locations identified for contingency re-
supply. Secondly, improved throughput means very little if
decreased container utilization results from the use of the
larger container. Thirdly, it has yet to be established






If military planners elect a reactive response, the
assumption inherent in this choice is that they do not feel
that the trend by the commercial ocean shipping industry
toward the 40 foot container is of sufficient strength to
be of concern to them. In view of this, and in view of their
expressed satisfaction with the use of 20 foot containers for
military use in contingency resupply, there is no need for a
plan of action to be developed, much less considered for im-
plementation. An underlying assumption here is that the
military is content to wait until there are more significant
indications of such a trend before considering the use of
40 foot containers.
Upgrade of port facilities and in-place cargo handling
equipment will not have an impact since peacetime military
operated resupply will continue to be operated with 20 foot
containers. Additionally, as long as resupply requirements
do not experience an unanticipated major growth as a result
of greatly expanded mission tasking, there will be no need
to look at increasing the size of the already existing pool
of military-owned containers. If such a need were to develop,
military planners might find themselves faced with diffi-
culties in procuring the number of 20 foot containers required
The military reactive response will continue the status
quo. If at some time in the future it becomes obvious to
military planners that the 20 foot container has indeed been
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replaced or is being replaced by the 40 foot container, action
can be taken at that time to bring military container opera-
tions into alignment with commercial operations. Military
plans can then be evaluated for contingency resupply using
the 40 foot container. Only then when it is truly a necessity,
will action be initiated to upgrade those locations currently
served by military container service using 20 foot containers.
The advantage to this response is that the military can
be assured of having more accurate information regarding the
trend towards 40 foot containers when decisions are made in
regards to the adoption of the military of this size of con-
tainer for its use. Continued expertise in the handling of
20 foot containers under contingency operations will be gained.
This additional expertise will stand the military in good
stead when and if the larger containers are adopted. Addi-
tionally, the military will not have been involved in the
upgrade of container handling equipment and of port struc-
tures until it has become necessary.
The disadvantage is that by waiting, the military may
be too late to efficiently make the switch to the larger
container. By not phasing in the upgraded equipment and
improvements of port structure over time, they may find them-
selves operating with severe limitations imposed by lack of
capability of both equipment and of port structure. Addi-
tionally, if contingency situations should develop, the mil-
itary runs the risk of finding itself with outmoded and poorly
conceived resupply plans. In short, there may not be the time
available for the needed upgrades to be made.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF SOLUTIONS
In the previous chapter, three alternate courses of
action available to military planners regarding the trend
by the commercial shipping industry to move towards the 4
foot container were discussed. Choice of a course of action
is dependent on how the military planners choose to view this
trend and what impact they forsee it having on the use of
containerization by the military.
A. DISCUSSION
It must be pointed out that the trend by the commercial
shipping industry to turn towards the use of the 40 foot
container is not going to have an immediate impact on the
composition of the commercial container fleet nor will it
impact on the immediate availability of 20 foot containers.
As the statistics show, the 20 foot container currently exists
in numbers sufficient to warrant its consideration as the
major container in use by the ocean shipping industry world-
wide [Ref. 27:pp 72-73].
What is significant here is that this is the current
status within the industry. Indications of a strong move
towards the 40 foot container exist, both in changes of con-
tainer fleet makeup and in the expressed forecasts and future
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plans of the U. S. flag container fleet owners. At what
point, or even if the 40 foot container will actually become
the dominant size container in use by commercial shippers is
unknown at this time. This has shown that the trend is there
and needs to be considered in its impact on current and
palnned military usage of containerization
.
For military planners to advocate a response of either
pro-action or reaction would, at this time, be premature.
Until the implications of this trend on military require-
ments and operations is understood, it is difficult to form-
ulate an appropriate response. To make no response, however,
is equally as dangerous; the development of plans and the
procurement of equipment requires time, sometimes in amounts
greater than the military has available.
Because of constraints imposed on the availability of
funding and the necessity that those funds available be spent
efficiently, to take immediate action in the procurement of
mass numbers of containers is not feasible. Procurement
action requires the careful identification of actual require-
ments. The total number of containers that will be required
to handle total contingency resupply, much less the number
of specific sized containers that would be required, is a
The movement toward the 40 foot container was discussed
at length in Chapter 4, Section A, pp 34-46.
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question that must give even the most optimistic of military
planners pause. What to do about ships that may or may not
be designed to carry a specific size container is another
question for which answers must be found.
But the dangers of not preparing are just as grave.
The interest in sealift and resupply generated by the Falk-
land Islands Conflict points directly to the dangers of
complacency [Ref. 15:pp 12-15]. Believing that somehow
everything will work itself out in the end can result in a
most rude awakening, often with disastrous implications. To
believe that the military can sit back and wait and see what
will happen as a result of the trend towards the longer con-
tainer may very well result in a response only at the time
of contingency. If so, it will be too late at that time to
correct any shortfalls or misfits of commercial assets with
military requirements and capabilities.
It would appear that only one of the solutions proposed
would be acceptable, given the nature of the problem. A
feasibility study, if conducted in a thorough manner, would
provide military planners with answers to all questions
raised as a result of the implications inherent to a trend
towards the 4 foot container. Some of these questions are:
How well will commercial container assets meet military re-
quirements? Will equipment capable of handling the larger
containers be available? Will the military itself have
equipment capable of handling the larger containers? What
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impact will the larger containers have on the availability
of ships? These are just a few of the many questions that
military planners must have answers to before they can de-
velop responsive plans of action.
Rather than requiring the expenditure of huge sums of
money that may in the future turn out to have been unnecessary,
a thorough study of the problem will lay the groundwork for
the determination and development of a logical decision as
to the direction the military ought to be taking in terms
of container size. If, for instance, the study reveals that
20 foot containers are far and away the logical choice for
the military, then steps can be taken to procure a pool of
containers sufficient to meet contingency needs.
If, on the other hand, the results of the study indi-
cate that 40 foot containers are all that are going to be
available for contingency use, then the military can take
steps to develop a means of efficiently handling that size
of container. Rather than replacing current cargo handling
equipment with new equipment of similar capability, the
military will know that current capability must be expanded
to meet the requirements of the larger containers. Rather
than having to make these replacements all at once, the
expense can be planned for and phased in over a period of
time.
Planning for contingency requires more than simply writing
plans and ensuring they mesh with one another. In the case of
plans that require reliance on commercial as well as military
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assets contingency planning means the careful monitoring of
trends within the commercial sector. But even that monitor-
ing is not adequate; evaluation of the future impact of
trends within the commercial sector is critical, if respon-
sive planning is to result.
B. CONCLUSION
In the beginning, containerization was a military con-
cept. However, as the commercial world came to realize the
benefits that could be gained in terms of reduced costs and
greater cargo protection, commercial development and use of
containerization far exceeded military involvement and in-
terest. From the original 35 and 20 foot containers, the
commercial sector is making the step to the 40 foot container,
leaving behind all other variations of container length. For
the military, however, once the initial step was taken and
the results deemed satisfactory, interest in further develop-
ment and use of containers apparently waned.
The military must, however, look beyond the 2 foot
container, if for no other reason than the fact that U. S.
flag assets, upon which contingency sealift and resupply must
depend, may not be available. The argument that the 4 foot
container is not compatible with either military cargo or
with military operations is not valid if the only containers
available are 40 foot containers.
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Too many times in the past, the military has allowed
itself to be caught off-guard in its contingency planning.
Too many times in the past Congress has been able to accuse
the military of impulsive action and a failure to accurately
plan its purchases of equipment. The situation is developing
for those same charges to be levied concerning contingency
planning for the use of containerization
.
The evidence is strong that the commercial ocean shipping
industry is experiencing a strong move towards the 4 foot
container. The time is now right for the military to prepare
for the results of that trend./' A study, designed to deter-
mine the impact on military use of containers for contingency
resupply and the operation of its peacetime container resupply
system, if conducted, would provide the military with the
answers it needs in order to responsively plan for the future.
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